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1. Introduction
The hydrocarbon-rich post-Soviet countries of the Cas-
pian Sea basin, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan, as well as Uzbekistan, are facing a difficult 
choice: where should they direct the major streams of 
their hydrocarbon exports?
All four directions are at stake: the North, the traditional 
Russian route, which has gone awry lately with regard to 
some countries; the South, namely Iran, which histori-
cally, as a »hydrocarbon country«, has all the necessary 
infrastructure and offers attractive rates for hydrocarbon 
transit to world markets; China, which is rapidly conquer-
ing key positions in Central Asia and already importing 
gas from Turkmenistan via a newly built pipeline; and fi-
nally, Europe, an immense and, what is more, reliable 
market, which by any estimation is profitable and allur-
ing.    1
It is always the case that the wider the choice the more 
difficult it is to make the correct decision. That is why al-
most all of the abovementioned countries presently find 
themselves at a »crossroads« and have not yet decided 
on which principal route to opt for to sell their main nat-
ural resources. It is therefore fairly likely that we will see 
the Caspian countries develop all four options. Another 
reason for this is that they do not want to put all their 
eggs in one basket – as they had to do in the past with 
Russia – even a new basket, such as the European Union 
(EU). Indeed, each of these routes is problematic, and it 
seems that some of them currently present insurmount-
able challenges, which presumably will have to be solved 
by politicians of the next generation.
1. BP (2010), Statistical Review of World Energy, p. 22, 24. Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_
assets/2010_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_
2010.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2010).
In this chapter, I shall explore the advantages and limita-
tions of the European option for Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan. For these two countries, gas deliveries to EU 
customers are especially promising – due to their relative 
geographic proximity and huge reserves (see Table 1) – 
whereas they are less realistic for Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. To enable Azeri and Turkmen deliveries is, 
however, also challenging since a number of hurdles 
have to be cleared from the path before gas can start 
flowing westwards.
2. Choosing the EU as a Customer?
Naturally, when a western orientation for Caspian gas 
deliveries to Europe is considered it is primarily the much-
talked-of Nabucco gas pipeline that is meant (see also 
Brendan Devlin’s and Katrin Heer’s chapter in this vol-
ume). What, therefore, are the advantages and limita-
tions of the western direction for gas transportation from 
the Caspian countries?
First of all, it should be mentioned that, historically and 
traditionally, Europe is the largest market in terms of de-
mand for hydrocarbons, especially for natural gas. It is 
not by chance that all gas pipelines running through the 
territory of the former Soviet Union and contemporary 
Russia are directed from east to west towards Europe. 
Forecasts for the EU also confirm fast-growing demand 
for additional natural gas in both the short and long 
terms. Moreover, it should be noted that the countries of 
the European Union and Europe as a whole are likely to 
be the most reliable business partners of all possible con-
sumers of natural gas from the Caspian Sea basin coun-
Table 1: Proven Reserves and Production of Natural Gas in the Caspian Countries1
Natural gas Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Proven reserves (2009) in trillion cubic metres 1.31 1.82 8.10 1.68
Share of world total in per cent 0.7 1.0 4.3 0.9
Production (2009) in billion cubic metres 14.8 32.2 36.4 64.4
Share of world total in per cent 0.5 1.1 1.2 2.2
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tries. This is especially noticeable when the new partners 
for purchasing of natural gas from Central Asia, such as 
Iran, China and Russia, periodically change contractual 
terms and even annul contracts, unilaterally suggesting 
alternative payment options, such as barter. European 
countries, most of which are members of the OECD, as a 
rule meet high standards of accountability and transpar-
ency and, in these term, are reliable and, most impor-
tantly, predictable partners.
Also important is the attraction of European values for 
most countries of the East. They have become the key 
driving force in efforts to join the European Union in the 
aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Al-
though there is no intention on the part of the Caspian 
countries to become members of the European Union, 
the EU is regarded as an attractive institution. Public 
opinion in all of the abovementioned countries unam-
biguously favours the EU and European values. In this 
sense, considering the EU as a business partner always 
triggers a positive reaction among the majority of mem-
bers of the national elite and civic representatives.
At the same time, the European route of natural gas de-
livery entails a number of limitations for the Caspian 
countries. First of all, there is a considerable geographical 
distance between the EU and the Caspian countries, es-
pecially the countries of Central Asia. Obviously, this cir-
cumstance makes the European route fairly unpredicta-
ble and high-cost. The unresolved issue of the Caspian 
Sea’s status should also be taken into account. Given the 
uncompromising position of Iran above all, the project of 
a Trans-Caspian – that is, sub-sea – gas pipeline making 
it possible to deliver natural gas from Central Asia via 
Azerbaijan to the EU seems rather vague. In addition, 
there are some inconveniences due to the Nabucco pipe-
line’s own architecture. Sometimes it seems that the Eu-
ropean Union has not clearly decided on the importance 
of this project. The large number of countries which are 
to be connected by the Nabucco gas pipeline is a hin-
drance to obtaining a firm political decision on it. It seems 
that various EU countries have different attitudes to-
wards the project. For some of them, such as the East 
European countries, it seems more important than for 
others (particularly France, Italy and some other older 
member states), which consider it to be non-essential. A 
lot depended on Germany’s position, which only recently 
declared itself a strong supporter of Nabucco. As a result, 
a political decision on the Nabucco pipeline and a mech-
anism for its financing look unconvincing and even nebu-
lous.
On the other hand, it is evident that some so-called au-
thoritarian Caspian countries are not particularly eager to 
enter into negotiations on gas supplies to Europe, being 
aware of possible consequences with regard to human 
rights, freedom of speech and democracy, which will 
have to be met as counter-obligations. In this sense, it is 
much easier to cooperate with Russia, Iran and China, 
countries which are absolutely indifferent towards such 
values, considering them to be the internal affair of indi-
vidual states. It is well known that human rights, freedom 
of speech and democracy are particularly burning issues 
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, although Kazakhstan 
and Azerbaijan also face a number of problems in those 
areas.
The importance of the Nabucco gas pipeline varies in re-
lation to different Caspian countries. Let us consider the 
motivating and obstructive factors for Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan.
3. Weaknesses of the Nabucco Project 
from Azerbaijan’s Perspective
The Nabucco gas pipeline project was initiated not by the 
supply side, but rather by the demand side; more pre-
cisely, by a group of gas importing countries. This involve-
ment on the demand side of financially stable importing 
countries can certainly be regarded as positive. However, 
although the importing countries can provide flawless 
gas delivery and guarantees for gas purchase at the ter-
minal point, the gas necessary to fill the pipeline may be 
lacking. The quantity of gas needed to fill the Nabucco 
pipeline to full capacity is currently still lacking, despite 
numerous agreements and assurances on the part of the 
producers. The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
crude oil pipeline in 2003 comes to mind, successful im-
plementation of which is linked to the fact that it was 
initialised by an oil producing country – Azerbaijan – 
which proved able to complete construction rapidly due 
to support from the West, above all, the United States.
Another weakness of the Nabucco gas pipeline project is 
the special role played by Turkey, which is gradually be-
coming the energy hub of the region. A friendly and stra-
tegic relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey is cer-
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tainly beneficial for mutual understanding between these 
countries and clearly account for the interest of each of 
these countries in this project. However, something else 
is at stake. Due to the Nabucco pipeline project and the 
other transit projects of the Southern Corridor Turkey has 
an obvious advantage in setting the terms of hydrocar-
bon transit through its territory. Needless to say, such 
terms may not always suit other partners, including 
Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia. The disa-
greement and protracted negotiations on the price for 
gas from the Azerbaijani natural gas field Shah Deniz and 
the rates for gas transit through the territory of Turkey il-
lustrate this. Fortunately, all these issues were success-
fully resolved in early May 2010. Now it can be hoped 
that the commercial relationship between the two coun-
tries will become a success. However, Turkey’s competi-
tive advantages with regard to gas transit to Europe and 
additional opportunities to participate in the Russian 
South Stream pipeline project further underpin its ability 
to dictate the terms of gas transit to Europe.
The third weakness of the Nabucco pipeline project is the 
rivalry it represents with regard to Russia. As the biggest 
natural gas producer in the world, Russia has its own in-
terests in the region. Having used its »energy weapon« 
in the region as a club to beat Ukraine with in 2004, Rus-
sia obviously has a vital interest in securing its monopoly 
of natural gas supplies to Europe. In this respect, other 
players and alternative pipelines going to Europe collide 
with Russia’s plans. That is why Russia is actively cooper-
ating with the leaders of Azerbaijan on the maximum ac-
cumulation of Azerbaijani gas in the northern direction, 
offering attractive conditions to purchase all available 
gas. The fact that Russia is presently buying Azerbaijani 
gas at the highest price in the world of 244 US dollars per 
1,000 cubic metres serves as proof positive of this.2 Al-
though the amount of gas being bought remains small, 
at 500 million cubic metres per year, Russia keeps urging 
Azerbaijan to increase it in order to minimise the amount 
of gas that Azerbaijan is able to ship to the EU.
2. RBK (2010), Dlya loyal’nykh RF stran Gazprom snizil tseny na gaz, 
3 June 2010. Available at: http://top.rbc.ru/economics/03/06/2010/
415719.shtml (accessed on 27 September 2010).
4. Nabucco as a Stimulus to Azerbaijan
Europe remains the most reliable and commercially at-
tractive destination for selling natural gas in the long run. 
Cooperation with the European Union has always been 
part of Azerbaijani policy. The natural gas business is no 
exception.
Azerbaijan is already in possession of an infrastructure for 
gas delivery to Turkey: the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline 
has been operating since 2007, and 9.1 billion cubic me-
tres (bcm) of gas had already been pumped through by 
early 2010.3 The capacity of the pipeline (41 inches in di-
ameter) is certainly not enough to meet the needs of the 
Nabucco project to its full extent, but, provided a suc-
cessful solution can be found to all issues, beginning with 
pipeline construction within the framework of the 
Nabucco project using the existing infrastructure, the gas 
passage capacity of this corridor can be extended with 
much greater benefits and efficiency.
Azerbaijan’s gas export policy can be expressed as fol-
lows: »diversify the diversification«. To put it another 
way, the Azerbaijani authorities have adopted and are 
successfully implementing the policy of securing maxi-
mum diversity of gas delivery routes. Consequently, now-
adays Azerbaijan possesses four pipelines and exports 
gas in all directions: to the west, using the Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum pipeline (5.2 bcm in 2009) and the Baku-Garda-
bani pipeline (less than 0.5 bcm per year); to the south, 
namely to Iran via the Hajigabul-Astara pipeline (0.5 bcm 
per year); and to the north, to Russia via the Hajigabul-
Mozdok pipeline (0.5 bcm per year).4 Nevertheless, it is 
obvious that by creating a diversity of gas delivery routes 
the government initiates competition between potential 
buyers and gives preference to the most profitable direc-
tion. In this respect, the Nabucco pipeline project fits well 
into the abovementioned policy and participating in this 
project would benefit Azerbaijan. On the flip-side, how-
ever, this means that Azerbaijan will never wish to dedi-
cate all of its gas to a single customer, including the EU.
Certainly, the recent package agreement with Turkey on 
gas gives Azerbaijan a mighty »carte blanche« for more 
active cooperation with the Nabucco project partners.
3. SOCAR presentation during the 17th Caspian International Oil & Gas 
Conference in Baku on 3 June 2010.
4. »Turan« and »Trend« information agencies.
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5. Weaknesses of the Nabucco Project 
from Turkmenistan’s Perspective
The fairly long distance between Turkmenistan and Eu-
rope is clearly a problem. Furthermore, the main Turkmen 
gas reserves are located in the east of the country, 
1,000 km away from the Caspian Sea. A gas pipeline 
connecting the east to the rest of the country needs to 
be built on land in order to deliver Turkmen gas to west-
ern destinations. The recent decision by the Turkmen au-
thorities to build such a pipeline without outside partici-
pation is controversial. Nobody knows the terminal point 
of delivery of the gas or its buyer, as the western border 
of Turkmenistan is not a point of sale, but rather an in-
termediate point of the gas transportation route. If this is 
a signal regarding the onshore route of gas transporta-
tion to Russia, why cannot the traditional Central Asia-
Centre pipeline also be used successfully? At the same 
time, no positive signs can be discerned so far in the ac-
tions of Turkmenistan’s political leadership with regard to 
the future Trans-Caspian route.
Another weakness of the Nabucco pipeline project is the 
continuing tension between Turkmenistan and neigh-
bouring Azerbaijan which, ironically, is primarily the result 
of energy issues. The controversy over the Kyapaz field (in 
Turkmenistan this small oil and gas field right in the 
middle of the Caspian Sea is referred to as the Sardar 
field) is still not settled, and the undefined legal status of 
the Caspian Sea merely aggravates these antagonisms. 
Judging by the pace of the negotiation process and Iran’s 
uncompromising stance, this stalemate is unlikely to be 
broken in the foreseeable future.
A third weakness of the Nabucco pipeline project, from 
Turkmenistan’s perspective, is the low attractiveness of 
hydrocarbon-rich Azerbaijan as a transit country. It is 
common knowledge that the poorer a transit country is 
in hydrocarbon resources the more attractive it is for pro-
ducers of raw materials to try to pump as much resources 
as possible over the territory of this transit country. The 
availability of natural resources in a transit country puts 
up »natural barriers« by creating competition for pump-
ing hydrocarbons over its territory. Naturally, Azerbaijan, 
with large reserves of natural gas, is interested in pump-
ing its own gas through the pipeline, and plans to export 
a total annual amount of 13 to 15 bcm of natural gas by 
2025, during the second stage of the Shah Deniz project.5 
Most of that volume could be provided to Nabucco. But 
does that mean that the most attractive time for Turk-
menistan to join the Nabucco pipeline project will be af-
ter 2020, when Azeri gas supply is expected to start to 
fall?
6. Nabucco’s Incentives to Turkmenistan
As for Azerbaijan, Europe is a very reliable and profitable 
long-term market for Turkmenistan. The Turkmen au-
thorities understand this very well and are aware that 
being cut off from this large market is likely to mean re-
maining behind while the world progresses. Despite the 
long distance and some obstacles to the delivery of Turk-
men gas to Europe this market seems very alluring.
Turkmenistan is also interested in diversifying its gas de-
livery routes to consumers. Turkmenistan’s natural gas 
reserves are considered to be the fourth largest in the 
world. The entire gas transportation system of the coun-
try used to be linked to Russia via the Central Asia-Centre 
pipeline system. That is why even after independence 
Turkmenistan was dependent on Russia, which bought 
Turkmen gas at low prices and resold it on European mar-
kets at higher rates. In 1997, Turkmenistan built its first 
export gas pipeline, to Iran. However, despite the capac-
ity of this pipeline – 8 billion cubic metres per year – Iran 
has never imported more than 6.5 bcm of the »blue fuel« 
from Turkmenistan.6
The highest level of gas production was achieved in Turk-
menistan in 1989 (89.9 bcm). In subsequent years, natu-
ral gas production fell fairly rapidly. In the mid-1990s, 
annual gas production dropped to some 30 bcm. Natural 
gas production has gradually increased since then, how-
ever, reaching 70.5 bcm in 2008.7
5. SOCAR presentation during the 16th Caspian International Oil & Gas 
Conference in Baku on 4 June 2009.
6. Tehran Times (2009), Iran-Turkmenistan gas pipeline inauguration 
slated for late Dec., 15 August 2009. Available at: http://www.tehran-
times.com/index_View.asp?code=200961 (accessed on 27 September 
2010).
7. Natal’ya Grib (2010), Turkmeniya predpochla evropejskuyu cenu 
ob’’emam eksporta gaza v Rossiyu, 11 January 2010. Available at: http://
www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1301816&ThemesID=188 (ac-
cessed on 27 September 2010); Nezavisimoe neftyanoe obozrenie 
Skvazhina, Neft’ v mire – Turkmenistan. Available at: http://www.nefte.
ru/oilworld/s2.htm (accessed on 27 September 2010).
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This was linked to the fact that Gazprom was rapidly in-
creasing its gas imports from Turkmenistan due to sky-
rocketing gas prices on European markets. However, the 
price fall of early 2009 resulted in the annual amounts of 
gas imported by Gazprom from Turkmenistan falling to 
around 10–11 bcm in 2010. It is widely believed that 
Gazprom, in order to avoid importing the promised an-
nual 50 bcm at the agreed high prices or paying the pen-
alty, induced the explosion in the Central Asia-Centre gas 
pipeline in April 2009. As a result, Turkmenistan’s annual 
natural gas production fell by an unprecedented 44.8 per 
cent in comparison to 2008, totalling a mere 36.4 bcm.8
At the end of 2009, the Turkmen government managed 
to put into operation an export gas pipeline Turkmeni-
stan-China. The second stage of this gas pipeline is cur-
rently under construction. However, the projected gas 
pipeline capacity of 40 bcm a year will not be realised 
before 2015. That is why Turkmenistan will scarcely 
achieve the production level of 2008 in the years to 
come. Turkmenistan is moving slowly but steadily to-
wards multi-vector gas transportation, with a view to re-
ducing its dependence on Russia. In this respect, the 
Nabucco pipeline project would fit perfectly into the ge-
ostrategic policy of the Turkmen authorities.
7. Conclusion
The examples of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan show that, 
despite a number of problems, the Caspian countries are 
very interested in the Nabucco pipeline project in general. 
Given these circumstances, the EU has the task of creat-
ing competitive opportunities for these gas producing 
countries. Aiming at the maximum acceleration of these 
processes, ending the doubts of the gas producing coun-
tries and persuading them to develop the western hydro-
carbon delivery routes, the European Union could take 
the following action.
First of all, the EU should demonstrate a united stand on 
the Nabucco pipeline project and its unanimous interest 
in this momentous project on the legislative, financial 
and political levels. This will inevitably give new impetus 
to potential gas suppliers and business partners in gen-
eral. The EU should also clearly separate commercial in-
terests from politics and offer a more competitive price 
8. BP (2010), Statistical Review of World Energy (see footnote 1), p. 24.
where needed in order to win over the Caspian countries 
from other competitors for gas resources. The EU should 
enter into an active and committed engagement with 
Turkmenistan as the long-term prospects of the Nabucco 
pipeline project look extremely vague without Turkmen 
participation. The European Union has considered Turk-
menistan one of the major suppliers of hydrocarbons for 
Nabucco since the project’s inception in 2002. However, 
the EU has so far failed to come up with concrete propos-
als, such as initiating financial support for infrastructural 
development, support for economic and legal reforms 
and other relevant programmes for the Turkmen side.
At present, Turkmenistan is steadily moving towards de-
termining its external economic and energy benchmarks. 
The events of recent years demonstrate that, overall, they 
do not favour the EU. China is positioning itself in the 
energy area with more and more confidence, and natural 
gas is being supplied to three destinations: China, Russia 
and Iran. Turkmenistan is drifting further away from the 
western course. The EU is constantly losing leverage. De-
spite these difficulties, the EU has a real opportunity to 
get a foothold in Turkmenistan and to guarantee its own 
energy security by diversifying large gas supplies to the 
European market.
